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POSTULATED STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AGREEMENT

As a basis for evaluating US national capabilities for verifying Soviet compliance with a US-Soviet agreement limiting strategic arms, it is postulated that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on the following:

1. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers

Fixed launchers (launch pads and silos) for ICBMs (ranges in excess of 5500 km) are limited to not more than     <sup>1/</sup> on each side, including those for test and training purposes. Any launchers beyond that number, including those under construction, as of the date of the agreement will be destroyed.<sup>2/</sup> Enlarging the internal dimensions of existing silos is prohibited.

1/ This number is left blank (as also in the case of submarines under construction, bombers, interceptors, and ABMs) not only because we do not know what it might be, but also in order to get an evaluation of the effect which variations in the size of the number might have on our ability to detect violations of consequence. This is particularly important in the case of ABMs, we believe.

2/ This means we will also want to evaluate the capabilities of unilateral means to verify destruction of silos.

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2. Fixed Land-Based IR/MRBM Launchers

Further construction of fixed land-based silos (or other launch facilities) for IR/MRBMs (ranges of 1000 to 5500 km) is prohibited. The replacement of IR/MRBMs with ICBMs at existing IR/MRBM launch sites,<sup>1/</sup> and the modification of existing IR/MRBM launch facilities to permit launching ICBMs, are prohibited. Enlarging internal dimensions of existing silos is prohibited.

3. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

Mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1000 km) are completely prohibited.<sup>2/</sup> Any such systems in existence as of the date of the agreement will be destroyed.

4. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

The construction of additional strategic offensive

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<sup>1/</sup> An important question here is how could we detect Soviet clandestine preparations for sudden abrogation and large-scale substitution of ICBMs for IR/MRBMs--e.g., by concealing stockpiles of ICBMs in the vicinity of IR/MRBM sites.

<sup>2/</sup> The question also arises here as to how we would detect Soviet clandestine preparations for sudden massive deployment. *How do we distinguish between mobile "tactical" ballistic missiles and mobile MRBMs or ICBMs?*

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missile (ballistic or cruise) launching submarines, or of additional launchers in existing submarines, is prohibited. Submarines under construction as of \_\_\_\_\_, to a maximum of \_\_\_\_\_, may be completed. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles is also prohibited. Existing missile launching submarines may be replaced in kind on a one-for-one basis after five years, subject to agreement on procedures.

5. Strategic Bombers

Strategic bombers (bombers with an empty weight of \_\_\_\_\_kg and an unrefueled radius of \_\_\_\_\_nm) are limited to \_\_\_\_\_for the US and \_\_\_\_\_for the Soviet Union. Major qualitative improvements in the armaments carried by such bombers are prohibited, as are changes in the bomber itself which would increase its unrefueled radius of operation by more than 25 per cent. Existing aircraft may be replaced on a one-for-one basis after five years, subject to agreement on procedures.

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6. MIRVs

The testing<sup>1/</sup> or deployment of multiple, individually targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), or maneuverable re-entry vehicles, on offensive missiles is prohibited.

7. Anti-ballistic Missile Systems

Fixed land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and missiles and ABM-associated radars<sup>2/</sup> are limited to \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3/</sup> on each side. Mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, are prohibited.

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<sup>1/</sup> How would we maximize our capabilities to learn the most from Soviet testing, not only with respect to MIRVs, but other systems as well?

<sup>2/</sup> One of the major questions here is how to determine which radars must be limited as "ABM-associated." What are the criteria? "Having a potential to contribute to ABM defenses" is too broad; "contributing to the effectiveness of ABM defenses" is too narrow. Where do we draw the line, and how do we avoid confusion and interference with other non-ABM radar development and deployment?

<sup>3/</sup> Missiles are limited because the Galosh is estimated to have a reload capability. Also consider whether we could verify compliance with a prohibition on reload capabilities for additional launchers which may be allowed.

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8. SAM Strategic Air Defenses

Deployment of additional strategic (ranges in excess of 40 nm), anti-aircraft, surface-to-air missile launchers (mobile or fixed) and their associated radars is prohibited.

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9. Interceptor Strategic Air Defenses

Fighter interceptors and associated ground or airborne radars will be limited to \_\_\_\_\_ for the US and \_\_\_\_\_ for the Soviet Union.

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We would establish the following priorities of effort if evaluation of our capabilities in all these areas cannot be completed in the allotted time: first, MIRV's, SAM's, ABM's and land-mobile missiles; second, submarine- and surface-ship-mounted missiles and IR/MRBM upgrading; third, bombers, interceptors and ICBMs. In Evaluating US capabilities in these various areas, you should also consider whether there are differentials in

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the national collection capabilities of the two sides which would make the Soviets less willing than the US to rely on national capabilities.

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